

The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Background Guide

GWCIA XXXI

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While GWCIA recognizes that the core value of participating in any Model UN committee is education in international affairs and the development of related skills such as productive collaboration, public speaking, and critical thinking, we also recognize the value of rewarding delegates who are exceptionally prepared and proficient in these skills. At GWCIA, we value delegates who can leverage creativity, diplomacy, substantive knowledge, and critical thinking skills to debate effectively, lead negotiations and blocs, and write comprehensive clauses. We especially look favorably towards delegates who individually develop meaningful solutions to the committee's main issues while keeping in mind the realistic diplomatic dynamics of our world, as well as those delegates who are able to advocate for their solutions and ideas to be adopted. The dais encourages delegates to lead in a manner that uplifts and respects their competitors while also introducing strong, unique solutions that consistently anchor their group's directive or working paper. On the other hand, attempts to undermine the goals of the committee without reason or acting without detailed thought of consequences are discouraged. Any rude, disrespectful, or demeaning conduct towards other delegates' ideas will not be tolerated.

Letter from the Chair

Dear Delegates,

My name is Addison Stief, and I'm pleased to serve as your chair for the United States Senate committee at this year's GWCIA. Currently, I am a freshman at GW studying International Affairs, though I'm planning to double major in Political Science and minor in Law and Society. I'm also a member of GW's Model UN team, mostly participating in specialized and general assembly committees. Outside of Model UN, I participate in GW's pep band, the Foghorns, and I'm a member of the Women's Leadership Program, a living-learning community on campus focused on developing as a leader in professional contexts. Additionally, I'm from Philadelphia, so I'm a fan of the Eagles and Phillies, and I follow Formula One in my free time.

In this committee, we will be exploring the aftermath of the Vietnam War, including Détente and the nuclear arms race. These are important subjects that still affect our world today as nations work to contain nuclear proliferation. Please keep in mind that the actions the Senate takes on behalf of the United States in this committee, would shape our present. I also trust that delegates will approach these topics with the level of maturity and sensitivity that they deserve. Warfare is no laughing matter, and I will not tolerate actions that escalate conflict without reasonable cause.

I look forward to meeting you all and assisting you in developing your diplomatic skills. Keep in mind that the best delegates aren't always the loudest voices. Please be respectful and kind toward your fellow delegates, and remain open to ideas that aren't your own. Successful resolutions will be passed due to collaboration and constructive debate. Until we convene, please familiarize yourself with the background guide and do your best independent research on your allocation. Please do not hesitate to reach out to me if you have any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

Addison Stief
a.stief@gwu.edu
Chair, The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

Reminder: Delegates must CC their advisor on any email sent to the Chair.

Introduction to the Committee

The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is the primary arm of the Senate that deals with foreign policy. Its responsibilities have historically involved the oversight of U.S. foreign aid regimes, foreign arms sales, and international military operations. The Foreign Relations Committee is the only committee that can deliberate on treaties and holds confirmation hearings for top U.S. Department of State officials. The committee holds an important role in overseeing the foreign policy actions of the President, often calling the Secretary of State, the USAID Administrator, and other lower-level State Department officials to testify on relevant foreign policy matters. In 1973, Democrats controlled the Senate, and the Committee's Chairman was J. William Fulbright (D-AR), while the ranking member was George Aiken (R-VT).

Background

The late 1960s were marked by a wave of political instability in the U.S. as the Civil Rights movement rose to national prominence, and the Vietnam War created a deep divide among the populace. From the mid 1960s to the early 1970s, the most prominent foreign policy issue for everyday Americans was the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War draft was enacted in 1964, forcing millions of young Americans to fight in a far-off conflict in Southeast Asia. After years of conflict with little to no strategic gains, President Nixon agreed to withdraw U.S. troops from Vietnam, and a tentative ceasefire was reached between North and South Vietnam in 1973. However, the tarnished legacy of the Vietnam War has led to calls for restrictions on the power of the President to deploy troops. At the same time, there is growing concern over the growing Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons, which U.S. intelligence agencies have warned will soon surpass the U.S. nuclear stockpile, threatening the ability of the U.S. to retaliate in a nuclear strike and thus strengthening the Soviet position in the Cold War. Under the framework of "mutually assured destruction,"[1] The U.S. was wary that having fewer nuclear weapons than the Soviets would increase Soviet willingness to conduct a first strike against the United States, and was further concerned with the political loss of the Soviets beating the U.S. in the nuclear arms race.

Background of the Vietnam War

U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was fundamentally based upon broader Cold War-era politics between the U.S.-led capitalist democratic West and the Soviet-led Communist East. In the 1950s and 1960s, Vietnam was split between North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

[1] In Nuclear Strategic Theory, this refers to how states will be averse to initiating a nuclear strike against another state if they feel that the enemy state will be willing and able to retaliate with their own nuclear strikes, leading to the destruction of both states.

North Vietnam was communist and backed by the Soviet Union and Communist China, while South Vietnam was a capitalist state supported by the U.S. and Western powers.

Vietnam had previously been a French colony since 1858, before losing it to the Japanese in 1940 during the Second World War. In the post-war agreements, France regained control of Vietnam; however, the country struggled to keep control of the colony against the League for Independence of Vietnam ("Viet Minh"). The Viet Minh were a Communist organization that had established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam ("DRV; North Vietnam") under Vietnam's first president, Hô Chi Minh.[2] The French were defeated by the Vietnamese at the disastrous battle of Diên Biên Phu in 1954, leading to the Geneva Accords that split Vietnam into two independent states, the Western-backed Republic of Vietnam ("RVN; South Vietnam") and North Vietnam.[3] South Vietnam was the successor state of the French-backed State of Vietnam and inherited the capitalist democratic system supported by the West. Despite the intention of both Vietnams to be reunified, South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diệm established the independent state of South Vietnam, which led to political clashes with DRV that prevented peaceful reunification.[4] The Soviet Union and Communist China provided political and military backing to the DRV, providing it with significant ability to threaten the RVN. In the late 1950s, Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam known as the Viet Cong began targeted assassinations and acts against the South Vietnamese government, which was supported by the North Vietnamese government, leading to direct military confrontation between both sides.[5]

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[2] U.S. Department of State, "Vietnam (06/06)," 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/vietnam/68346.htm.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Vassar College, "The Vietnam War: An Overview - The Wars for Viet Nam | The Wars for Vietnam | Vassar College," Vassar.Edu, 2025, https://www.vassar.edu/the-wars-for-vietnam/vietnam-war-overview.
[5] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Gulf of Tonkin and Escalation, 1964," State.Gov, accessed October 11, 2026, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/gulf-of-tonkin.

The U.S. maintained limited political and military support for the French and later the South Vietnamese since the Truman administration in the form of military advisors and later diplomatic recognition of the South Vietnamese State. U.S. support of South Vietnam was based on the fear that if South Vietnam fell to Communist North Vietnam, Communism would spread to countries like Thailand, the Philippines, and wider Asia. As the conflict with North Vietnam increased in severity, the U.S. ramped up its military assistance to RVN but stopped short of sending U.S. troops until 1964.[6] In the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, two U.S. naval vessels alleged that North Vietnamese vessels had attacked them twice in international waters near North Vietnam. The incident led Congress to pass the Tonkin Resolution, which allowed President Johnson far-reaching powers to deploy U.S. troops in Southeast Asia, leading to the deployment of U.S. troops in 1965. [7]

Despite initial forecasts that U.S. deployments in Vietnam would lead to an easy and rapid victory for South Vietnam, U.S. forces were instead stuck in a military quagmire in Vietnam. Super U.S. firepower was assumed to be more than enough for the U.S. to defeat the technologically inferior North Vietnamese and force a surrender; however, this proved to be ineffective against North Vietnamese counterinsurgency and guerrilla tactics. The U.S. was unable to directly invade North Vietnam due to the threat of a Chinese intervention, and Viet Cong insurgents threatened U.S. and RVN forces in South Vietnam with guerrilla attacks in cities like Saigon.[8] The conflict was marred by war crimes by U.S. and RVN forces, including the

[6] Council on Foreign Relations, "Deployment of Combat Forces to Vietnam - The 10 Best and 10 Worst U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions," CFR, January 13, 2026, https://www.cfr.org/ten-best-ten-worst-us-foreign-policy-decisions/deployment-of-combat-forces-to-vietnam/.
[7] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Gulf of Tonkin and Escalation, 1964," State.Gov, accessed October 11, 2026, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/gulf-of-tonkin.
[8] Council on Foreign Relations, "Deployment of Combat Forces to Vietnam - The 10 Best and 10 Worst U.S. Foreign Policy Decisions," CFR, January 13, 2026,

infamous My Lai massacre, where hundreds of South Vietnamese civilians were killed by U.S. forces.[9] The heavily televised society of the 1960s showed the war to American homes for the first time in history, with scarring images of massacres, violence, and war crimes shown to millions of Americans at home. By the time a ceasefire was reached, nearly 60,000 U.S. service members had been killed, alongside over 3 million Vietnamese deaths on both sides, 320,000 Cambodian deaths, and 60,000 Laotian deaths.[10] By 1973, the U.S. agreed to withdraw from Vietnam under the Paris Peace Accords, guaranteeing the RVN independence and the right to determine its future peacefully.[11]

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https://www.cfr.org/ten-best-ten-worst-us-foreign-policy-decisions/deployment-of-combat-forces-to-vietnam/.

[9]Fred L. Borch, "What Really Happened on 16 March 1968? What Lessons Have Been Learned? A Look at the My Lai Incident Fifty Years Later - The Campaign for the National Museum of the United States Army," The Campaign for the National Museum of the United States Army, May 4, 2018, https://armyhistory.org/my-lai/.

[10]Lewy, Guenter. *America in Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

[11]U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Milestones: 1969–1976," State.Gov, 2018, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/ending-vietnam.

Current Situation

The most prominent issues for the committees revolved around the path forward for the U.S. in a post-Vietnam world and the move towards détente and the stabilization of relations with the USSR and China.

Post-Vietnam

While the U.S. had agreed to withdraw its forces from Vietnam, the ceasefire established did not guarantee that the DRV would not pursue later aggression against the RVN. The U.S. withdrawal meant there would not be a hard deterrent against another DRV incursion, thus the U.S. must pursue alternative means to maintain its partner in the RVN. The U.S. currently still maintains significant financial support towards the RVN to bolster its own military forces and prop up the government there, however many have come to question this continued financial support.[12] Furthermore, while the U.S. has directly withdrawn from Vietnam, much of its air assets have been relocated to Thailand (a U.S. ally) and in the event of an DRV incursion, could intervene to prevent the fall of the RVN.[13] While some in the White House would approve of this "limited" protection of the RVN, it would risk reentering the U.S. into Vietnam. While many in the U.S. public and government admit that Vietnam was a disastrous mistake, many are still committed to ensuring the continued existence of the RVN, in a similar vein to how North and South Korea still exist.

Alongside the current policy towards Vietnam, the Congress must also determine new measures to ensure that another executive-office overreach does not lead to another intervention

[12]Henry Kissinger, "Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford," Memorandum, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, September 9, 1974.
[13]National Museum of the United States Air Force, "Coming Home: The U.S. Exits Southeast Asia," National Museum of the United States Air Force, accessed October 11, 2026, https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/195945/coming-home-the-us-exits-southeast-asia/.

like Vietnam. The Tonkin Resolution gave the President wide reaching powers to deploy troops without Congressional oversight, which many have pointed to as a mistake. There are increased calls for Congress to enact stricter controls on how the President can deploy troops and increase congressional oversight.[14] While such measures would prevent further presidential overreach, it may hamper the ability of the U.S. to react to rapidly changing international events. If military deployments must go through Congress, the U.S. may not be able to react in time before another U.S. ally falls to communism.

Detente and the Nuclear Arms Race

Since 1969, there has been an unprecedented era of relative stability between the USSR and U.S. The Nixon administration engaged with Moscow in dialogues and talks as a means to desolate further conflicts with the Eastern bloc like in Vietnam. In 1972, the USSR and U.S. agreed to sign the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibited the development and stockpiling of biological weapons, alongside the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited the amount and range of the anti-ballitic missile systems of each power.[15] That year, the two powers also signed the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks I ("SALT I") treaty, agreeing to freeze their Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBMs) launcher's numbers for five years.[16] These talks have all worked to decrease tensions between the two superpowers, and there is generally a consensus across party lines that these steps are beneficial. However, there is still some controversy. Some have called to advance further from the SALT I treaty and move towards denuclearization,

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[14]Michael Greene, "War Powers Resolution: Expedited Procedures in the House and Senate," Congress.Gov, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47603.
[15] U.S. Department of State, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty)," U.S. Department of State, 2009, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/101888.htm.; U.S. Department of State, "The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," State.Gov, 2017, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/bw/c48737.htm.
[16]U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II," State.Gov, 2019, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt.

having both powers decrease their nuclear arsenals, which many in Washington feel as unacceptable, even if the Soviets agree to such an arrangement. Furthermore, this detente has coupled with increased engagement with the People's Republic of China, which has come at the expense of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. While many see rapprochement to China as a beneficial means to counter Soviet influence, others are concerned with the costs it has with the U.S. relationship with Taiwan and the broader ideological challenge of working with a Communist power. [17]

[17] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Rapprochement with China, 1972," State.Gov, 2019, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/rapprochement-china.

Questions to Consider

1) How can the U.S. ensure the continued independence of South Vietnam without committing military resources? Should America continue supporting South Vietnam?
2) How can the U.S. recover internationally from the embarrassment of the Vietnam War and garner more positive views from the Western and Non-Aligned World?
3) Should the U.S. be engaging with Communist China against the Soviet Union, or should the U.S. be hostile to both powers?
4) Should the U.S. increase nuclear production to compete with the Soviets or engage in diplomatic agreements with the Soviets to regulate each other's nuclear warhead production?

Committee Dossier

1. *J. William Fulbright (D-AR)*

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of the Senate's most influential foreign-policy voices. Fulbright argues that the Vietnam War demonstrated the dangers of American overreach, ideological rigidity, and excessive reliance on military power. He views détente with the Soviet Union as a fundamental opportunity to reshape East-West relations, strongly supports expanded diplomatic engagement with the People's Republic of China, and believes continued nuclear competition diverts resources and attention from more productive forms of statecraft. He favors a major post-Vietnam shift toward restraint, diplomacy, and stronger congressional control over foreign-policy decisions.

2. *John J. Sparkman (D-AL)*

Senior Alabama senator and longtime member of the Foreign Relations Committee, respected as a pragmatic Cold War Democrat. Sparkman believes the United States must learn from the Vietnam experience without retreating from its global responsibilities or alliance commitments. He supports détente and strategic-arms negotiations with the Soviet Union as tools for preserving stability, but remains cautious about Soviet intentions and insists that agreements must not compromise American security. He views opening relations with China as a useful strategic development and continues to advocate a strong military and credible nuclear deterrent.

3. *Mike Mansfield (D-MT)*

Senate Majority Leader and one of Congress's leading authorities on Asian affairs. Mansfield believes the Vietnam War exposed the limits of American military power and demonstrated the need to reduce overseas commitments. He strongly supports improving relations with China and

sees diplomatic engagement in Asia as a preferable alternative to large permanent military deployments. He favors détente with the Soviet Union and negotiated limits on strategic weapons, though his primary concern is reducing unnecessary burdens on American resources and interests abroad.

4. *Frank Church (D-ID)*

A leading liberal voice on foreign affairs and a prominent member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Church argues that the Vietnam War revealed the dangers of excessive executive power, military intervention, and insufficient congressional oversight. He supports détente and meaningful arms-control agreements as ways to reduce Cold War tensions but places particular emphasis on restoring constitutional limits to foreign policymaking. He welcomes closer relations with China, supports slowing the nuclear arms race, and seeks to ensure that future administrations face greater congressional scrutiny before committing U.S. forces overseas.

5. *Stuart Symington (D-MO)*

Former Secretary of the Air Force and an experienced national-security legislator with extensive defense expertise. Symington supports diplomatic engagement with both the Soviet Union and China but evaluates foreign policy primarily through questions of military balance and strategic credibility. He favors détente and strategic-arms agreements so long as they preserve American nuclear superiority or parity and remain verifiable. Although skeptical of unchecked executive authority and secret military operations, he remains one of the Senate's strongest advocates of maintaining a robust defense establishment.

6. *Claiborne Pell (D-RI)*

Rhode Island senator known for his international outlook and commitment to diplomatic solutions. Pell believes lasting stability depends more on dialogue, cooperation, and international

engagement than military competition. He strongly supports détente, expanded relations with China, and greater use of international institutions to manage conflicts. Particularly concerned about the catastrophic risks posed by nuclear weapons, he consistently advocates arms-control efforts designed to reduce the likelihood of superpower confrontation.

7. *Gale W. McGee (D-WY)*

Wyoming senator and former educator who generally supports an active American role in world affairs. McGee believes the lessons of Vietnam require greater prudence in the use of force but not a withdrawal from international leadership. He supports détente because it provides a stable framework for managing competition with the Soviet Union, favors improved relations with China, and backs arms-control negotiations that strengthen rather than diminish the American strategic position. He continues to view alliances and diplomatic engagement as essential instruments of American influence.

8. *Edmund Muskie (D-ME)*

Former Democratic vice-presidential nominee and one of the Democratic Party's leading moderates. Muskie believes the United States can emerge from Vietnam with its alliances and international leadership intact by emphasizing diplomacy, consultation, and arms control. He strongly supports détente, continued progress toward normalization with China, and ambitious efforts to slow the nuclear arms race through agreements such as a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. While advocating reform, he does not support a fundamental reduction in America's global responsibilities.

9. *George McGovern (D-SD)*

The Democratic presidential nominee in 1972 and the Senate's most prominent antiwar advocate. McGovern views the Vietnam War as a strategic and moral failure that reflects the excessive

militarization of American foreign policy. He favors significant reductions in overseas military commitments, substantial cuts in defense expenditures, and a broad reorientation of national priorities away from Cold War competition. He strongly supports détente, improved relations with both Moscow and Beijing, aggressive arms-control negotiations, and international efforts to curb nuclear proliferation.

10. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN)

Former Vice President and one of the Democratic Party's most recognizable national leaders. Humphrey remains firmly committed to American alliances and international leadership but believes diplomacy must play a larger role in managing Cold War rivalries after Vietnam. He supports détente, engagement with China, and nuclear-arms agreements intended to reduce tensions while preserving stability between the superpowers. Unlike more antiwar senators, he seeks to reform and modernize American foreign policy rather than significantly reduce its global scope.

11. George D. Aiken (R-VT)

Veteran Vermont senator known for his independent judgment and practical approach to foreign affairs. Aiken believes the Vietnam experience demonstrates the dangers of becoming trapped in prolonged conflicts that serve limited strategic purposes. He supports détente and engagement with China from a pragmatic perspective, viewing both as sensible adjustments to changing international realities rather than ideological breakthroughs. While favoring a strong defense and reliable alliances, he generally advocates restraint, realism, and careful consideration before future military interventions.

12. Clifford P. Case (R-NJ)

A leading liberal Republican and one of the Senate's most vocal critics of prolonged U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Case argues that Congress must reclaim a larger role in foreign policymaking and work to prevent future military entanglements similar to Vietnam. He supports détente, expanded diplomatic relations with China, and strategic-arms agreements intended to lower the risk of nuclear confrontation. His foreign-policy views frequently align more closely with moderate and liberal internationalists than with traditional Cold War hawks.

13. Jacob K. Javits (R-NY)

Influential New York senator and a major figure in the liberal wing of the Republican Party. Javits believes the post-Vietnam era presents an opportunity to build a more stable and cooperative international order through law, diplomacy, and multilateral engagement. He strongly supports détente, rapprochement with China, strategic-arms negotiations, and stronger legal constraints on presidential war powers. While remaining committed to American leadership, he favors resolving international tensions through institutions and negotiation whenever possible.

14. Hugh Scott (R-PA)

Senate Republican Leader and a key supporter of the Nixon administration's foreign-policy strategy. Scott champions détente and the opening to China as major diplomatic achievements that strengthen the United States in its broader competition with the Soviet Union. He supports strategic-arms negotiations but insists they be accompanied by strong military capabilities and a credible nuclear deterrent. Although he accepts the end of major U.S. involvement in Vietnam, he rejects calls for retrenchment and argues that America must continue leading the Western alliance system.

15. James B. Pearson (R-KS)

Kansas senator known as a thoughtful moderate with a strong interest in foreign affairs. Pearson believes the United States should avoid repeating the mistakes of Vietnam while maintaining an active and responsible international role. He supports détente, improved relations with China, and negotiated arms-control agreements, but also emphasizes the importance of preserving an effective American deterrent. Pearson favors greater congressional participation in decisions concerning war and peace and often seeks compromise between competing schools of foreign-policy thought.

16. Charles H. Percy (R-IL)

Young and ambitious Illinois senator who is emerging as a leading advocate of a modern, internationally engaged Republican foreign policy. Percy strongly supports expanding political and economic engagement with both the Soviet Union and China and is notably optimistic about the possibilities created by diplomacy. He places particular emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation and arms-control initiatives, believing that technological and diplomatic cooperation can reduce global tensions. Following Vietnam, he advocates a foreign policy that relies less heavily on military force and more on international partnerships.

17. Robert P. Griffin (R-MI)

Assistant Republican Leader and a reliable supporter of a strong national-defense posture. Griffin accepts the withdrawal from Vietnam but warns that excessive American retrenchment could encourage Soviet expansion and weaken allied confidence in U.S. commitments. He supports détente and strategic-arms negotiations as long as they preserve American military strength and strategic flexibility, and he views improved relations with China largely through their value in balancing Soviet power. Among his colleagues, he remains one of the strongest advocates of maintaining a powerful nuclear deterrent and a firm global posture.

18. Henry M. Jackson (D-WA)

Washington senator and chairman of the Interior Committee, widely known for his influential views on national security and defense policy. Jackson accepts strategic-arms negotiations and limited détente with the Soviet Union but remains deeply skeptical of Soviet intentions and opposes agreements that could leave the United States at a military disadvantage. He supports maintaining overwhelming American strategic and conventional military strength, argues that the lessons of Vietnam should not lead to retreat from global responsibilities, and strongly favors continued U.S. leadership among its allies. Although supportive of diplomatic engagement with China, he views the relationship primarily through its strategic value in balancing Soviet power rather than as a transformative political partnership. *Note* Senator Jackson was not a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in real life.

19. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ)

Arizona senator and former Republican presidential nominee who remains one of the Senate's most prominent conservative voices on foreign affairs. Goldwater views the Vietnam War as a poorly managed conflict rather than evidence that American global commitments should be reduced. He is highly skeptical of détente, doubts that the Soviet Union can be trusted to honor the spirit of arms-control agreements, and consistently argues for a strong military posture backed by unquestioned nuclear superiority. While willing to engage diplomatically with China, he remains focused on containing communist influence worldwide and opposes policies he believes project American weakness. *Note* Senator Goldwater was not a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in real life.

20. Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA)

Massachusetts senator and one of the most visible figures in the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Kennedy believes the Vietnam War demonstrates the dangers of excessive reliance on military solutions and supports redirecting greater attention toward diplomacy, development, and international cooperation. He strongly favors détente, expanded engagement with both the Soviet Union and China, and ambitious efforts to control nuclear weapons and prevent proliferation. While committed to maintaining American alliances and international leadership, he advocates a more humanitarian and less militarized approach to Cold War competition. *Note* Senator Kennedy was not a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in real life.

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